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Disclaimer: The case on which this summary is based may no longer be current law. Also, if the case was decided on summary judgment, the court recited the "facts" in the light most favorable to the non-movant, which may not be the true facts.

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Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. April 11, 2001)

Keywords: Title VII (race discrimination, failure to promote) and Section 1985(3) conspiracy   

Introduction: Five white firefighters sued the City, the Fire Chief and the City Manager under Title VII and Section 1985(3). The district court granted summary judgment on behalf of the defendants. The Eleventh Circuit affirms.

Facts: Five white firefighters sought promotion to lieutenant. The determination of who was qualified to be considered for the promotion was based on a three step process: (1) written exam (which counted for 30 percent of the overall score); (2) assessment center (which counted for 50 percent); and (3) interview exam (which counted for 20 percent).

Applicants had to score at least 70 out of a possible 100 to be considered qualified for promotion.

In making the ultimate promotion decision, the black Fire Chief, Henry Fields, did not consider the relative qualification scores. Instead, he considered the following subjective factors: (1) demonstrated leadership; (2) maturity; (3) interpersonal skills; and (4) a willingness to support management and its policies.

The five white firefighters (all of whom met the qualifications to be considered) allege that the Fire Chief selected two black firefighters for promotion based on race.

Law:

  1. Title VII disparate treatment claim
    1. The plaintiffs rely on five points to show that Chief Fields' decisions were racially motivated: (1) statistical evidence that Chief Fields scored black candidates higher on the oral phase of the qualification exercise than he did white candidates, even though white candidates scored higher on the "objective" phases of that process; (2) defendants' decision to make the hiring process largely subjective; (3) evidence that the plaintiffs were more qualified than the two black firefighters selected for promotion; (4) the fact that the City's affirmative action plan sets hiring and promotion goals favoring blacks; and (5) the fact that a district court (subsequently affirmed by this Court) rejected Chief Fields' race-neutral explanation for the allegedly discriminatory promotion decision at issue in an earlier lawsuit.
    2. The statistical evidence argument fails because: (1) the fact that whites scored better on the objective phases does not mean they will score better on the subjective phase; (2) black applicants were selected for promotion at a rate statistically insignificant from the rate at which white applicants were promoted; and (3) the disparity between whites and blacks on the subjective phase also occurred two years later when Chief Fields was not involved in the selection process.
    3. The fact that Chief Fields used subjective qualifications is not evidence of discrimination. A subjective reason is a legally sufficient, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason if the defendant articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis upon which it based its subjective opinion.
    4. The five white firefighters argue that they were more qualified for the promotions than the two black firefighters who were selected. But with most of the white firefighters, they provide very little evidence of their "superior" qualifications. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit requires a strong showing of a disparity in qualifications in order for an inference of discrimination to arise. The evidence in this case is insufficient.
    5. With respect to the City's affirmative action plan, it does not provide for quotas. It does set goals for the hiring of blacks and other protected groups. But the Court holds that there is no evidence that Chief Fields considered the affirmative action plan, let alone that he thought he was filling some quota.
    6. Finally, in an earlier lawsuit, the district court held that Chief Fields had discriminated on the basis of race with respect to a 1994 promotion to the position of Battalion Chief. But this earlier lawsuit concerned a different position and occurred two years before the decisions at issue in this case. Moreover, courts are reluctant to consider "prior bad acts" in this context where those acts do not relate directly to the plaintiffs. Finally, the Court notes that the district court judge in the earlier lawsuit (who found that Chief Fields had discriminated) is the same judge who in this lawsuit granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
    7. Therefore, the Court finds insufficient evidence of pretext for the failure to promote claims to survive summary judgment.
  2. 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3) claim
    1. The plaintiffs argue that there was a "de facto" conspiracy between the City Manager (who is black) and Chief Fields to increase the role of subjective evaluation in the promotion process.
    2. The elements of a Section 1985(3) claim are: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
    3. Because the plaintiffs failed to show that they were victims of discrimination, they could not have been "deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."
    4. Moreover, their claim fails under the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Under this doctrine, employees of a corporation cannot conspire amongst themselves because their acts are the actions of the corporation and a single entity cannot conspire with itself. This doctrine also applies to a City and its personnel.
  3. Click here to see actual case.

 



 

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