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Garland's Digest
on employment discrimination law
online since 1997
 

 

Disclaimer: The case on which this summary is based may no longer be current law. Also, if the case was decided on summary judgment, the court recited the "facts" in the light most favorable to the non-movant, which may not be the true facts.

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District Council 37, AFSCME v. New York City Dept. of Parks and Recreation, 113 F.3d 347 (2d Cir. Cir. May 14, 1997)

Keywords: ADEA (disparate impact, jury instructions)

Introduction: Former employees sued New York City under the ADEA as a result of a reduction in force. A jury found in favor of New York City. The class of plaintiffs appeals on the ground that the district court erred with respect to the jury instructions. The Second Circuit affirms.

Facts: From 1991 to 1992, New York City cut its Parks Department budget from $176 million to $108 million. This necessitated a reduction in force. Under New York law, the Parks Department could decide which job titles to cut and how many employees within these job titles to cut. But once that decision was made, then New York law required that temporary employees be laid off before permanent employees within a job title; and that permanent employees within a job title be laid off in inverse order of seniority. The Parks Department decided to eliminate entirely the job title "Laborer." Everyone employed as a Laborer was over the age of 40, and their average age was 57. The plaintiffs are the former "Laborers."

Law:

1. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), the Supreme Court reserved the question of whether a disparate impact claim is cognizable under the ADEA. However, the Second Circuit has held that a disparate impact claim can be asserted under the ADEA.
2. In Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), the Supreme Court held that employees can make a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that a step in an employment practice had significant disparate impact on a protected class of which the employee was a member, regardless of whether the bottom line was discriminatory.
3. The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that a nondiscriminatory bottom line was no defense to a disparate impact claim. Under Second Circuit law, the employer can only be held liable for a step in an employment practice that had a significant disparate impact, if that step was dispositive. In other words, that employment step was an outright barrier to consideration under subsequent steps.
4. An example of a dispositive step: Applicants for a position are given a written exam. If they did not make a certain score, then they are no longer considered for the position.
5. New York City argues that the first step (which job titles to cut and how many within a job title to cut) is not dispositive because the next two steps decide which employees are actually laid off (i.e. step two, lay off temporary employees and step three, layoff permanent employees in inverse order of seniority).
6. The plaintiff class argues that it was dispositive with respect to them because the entire job title of Laborers was eliminated. New York City counters by pointing out that ten of the Laborers exercised their seniority rights to bump other employees in other job titles.
7. The Second Circuit decides that it does not have to reach the issue of whether the first step was a dispositive step because it finds that the jury instructions were adequate. In other words, the jury instructions correctly explained that for the plaintiffs to make a prima facie case of disparate impact, they had to identify a particular employment practice and show that the practice had a significant disparate impact on employees age 40 and older.
8. The plaintiffs could have shown that the overall result of the layoffs (or the bottom line result) had a disparate impact on employees age 40 or older; or that a step in the process had a disparate impact.
9. Because the district court adequately instructed the jury on the law, the requested instruction "that a nondiscriminatory bottom line was no defense to a disparate impact claim" is an instruction on a "nondefense." The absence of an instruction on a nondefense did not render the jury instructions inadequate or misleading.
10. Click here to see actual case.