Court upholds jury verdict re FedEx's failure to
accommodate deaf employee.
EEOC v. Federal
Express Corp., 513 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. January 23, 2008)
Facts: This is an ADA action. Ronald Lockhart has
been profoundly deaf since birth. He is unable to either speak or read
lips, but is fluent in American Sign Language ("ASL"), which is his
primary language. He has studied English, but never mastered the
language.
Between March 2000 and
January 2003, Lockhart was employed by FedEx as a package handler at
FedEx's Baltimore-Washington International Airport facility. While
working for FedEx, Lockhart made repeated requests for an ASL
interpreter and other accommodations so that he could understand what
occurred at employee meetings and training sessions.
During the first two
years of his employment, Lockhart received no ASL interpretation or
closed-captioning accommodations for any employee meetings. The EEOC's
evidence at trial demonstrated that Victor Cofield, Lockhart's
supervisor, routinely ignored Lockhart's requests for accommodations.
Also, even though English was Lockhart's second language, for most of
the three-year period that he worked for FedEx, Cofield resorted to
writing notes to Lockhart as his sole means of communication with
Lockhart.
Also, FedEx's personnel
records indicate that Lockhart completed twenty-four separate
company-administered training courses -- including courses on how to
avoid workplace violence, how to recognize and interpret hazard labels
on packages, and how to safely handle dangerous materials. According to
these records, Lockhart performed satisfactorily in all of the graded
training sessions. On those occasions when an employee would have to
take a computerized test at the end of a training session, FedEx would
direct a team leader to sit with Lockhart and answer questions for him
if he made incorrect answers.
On October 17, 2001,
Lockhart filed an EEOC charge. In January 2002, Cofield began
making a certified ASL interpreter available for some purposes, but
Lockhart never received ASL translation assistance for any daily
briefings, training sessions, or quarterly meetings with FedEx's senior
management. Cofield also made other efforts to accommodate Lockhart,
such as ordering closed-caption versions of training videos used in the
FedEx monthly meetings.
Nearly three years after he began working at the
FedEx-BWI Ramp, and just a few weeks after Cofield first learned that
Lockhart had filed his discrimination charge with the EEOC, Lockhart was
provided with FedEx's approved form for requesting disability
accommodations. Later that same month,
on January 17, 2003, FedEx discharged Lockhart from his employment,
citing deficient attendance as the reason for its decision. Lockhart
then filed an additional EEOC charge alleging retaliatory discharge.
At trial, Pat Hanratty, the Senior Operations Manager at
the FedEx-BWI Ramp, acknowledged that he was aware of FedEx's ADA
compliance policy and that he had received ADA training from FedEx.
However, during Lockhart's employment Hanratty never utilized the People
Manual (FedEx's human resources policy manual) to ascertain how to
accommodate Lockhart's deafness disability. Cofield, Lockhart's direct
supervisor, had never received any ADA training. However, it should be
noted that Cofield did make several efforts to obtain clarification from
other senior FedEx officials about FedEx's ADA-mandated obligation to
accommodate Lockhart's disability.
District court: The jury found in favor of the
EEOC on the ADA failure to accommodate claim; but the jury found in
favor of FedEx on the retaliation claim. The jury awarded Lockhart the
sum of $8,000 in compensatory damages, plus $100,000 in punitive
damages.
Appeal: On appeal, FedEx asserts that the trial
court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law
because the evidence was insufficient to support the punitive damages
award. Additionally, FedEx contends that the district court erred in
rejecting its alternative request for a remittitur in that the punitive
damages award was unconstitutionally excessive.
With respect to FedEx's contention that the district
court erred in denying its Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of
law on the punitive damages award, an award of punitive damages can be
based on either a finding of malice or reckless indifference. The EEOC
relies on the theory of reckless indifference. The Fourth Circuit has
previously explained that in order for a punitive damages award to be
justified on the basis of reckless indifference, the evidence must be
sufficient for a reasonable jury to make four findings:
(1) That the employer's decision maker discriminated
in the face of a perceived risk that the decision would violate
federal law;
(2) That the decision maker was a principal or
served the employer in a managerial capacity;
(3) That the decision maker acted within the scope
of his employment in making the challenged decision; and
(4) That the employer failed to engage in good-faith
efforts to comply with the law.
See,
Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 443-45
(4th Cir. 2000).
FedEx contests factors one and four. With respect to the
first factor, FedEx contends that Cofield and Hanratty "knew that
accommodations were required," and that they "believed they were making
sufficient accommodations" for Lockhart. The Court reviews the evidence
and finds that the trial evidence was sufficient for the jury to find,
by a preponderance thereof, that a managerial official of FedEx
perceived the risk that his failure to provide Lockhart with reasonable
accommodations would contravene the ADA.
With respect to the fourth Lowery factor, FedEx
contends that punitive damages liability could not properly be imputed
to it because it made good-faith efforts to comply with the ADA.
Specifically, FedEx contends that adoption of its ADA compliance policy,
in conjunction with its internal grievance policy for handling employee
complaints, established that it had acted in good faith to comply with
the ADA.
But the mere existence of an ADA compliance policy will
not alone insulate an employer from punitive damages liability. An
employer maintaining such a compliance policy must also take affirmative
steps to ensure its implementation. The Court holds that on the
evidence, the jury was entitled to find that FedEx failed to
sufficiently take affirmative steps to ensure the implementation of its
ADA compliance policy with respect to Lockhart. As a result, the Court
affirms the district court's denial of FedEx's Rule 50 motion for
judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damages award.
Next, FedEx challenges the district court's denial of
its motion for a remittitur on the $100,000 punitive damages award.
FedEx maintains that the award was unconstitutionally excessive and
should be reduced because (1) there was insufficient evidence to show
that Lockhart's supervisors had acted reprehensibly; (2) the award was
unconstitutionally out of proportion to the $8,000 compensatory damages
award; and (3) the district court erred in upholding the award solely on
the basis that it was below the statutory damages cap.
With respect to whether there was sufficient evidence
that Lockhart's supervisors had acted reprehensibly, the Court considers
five factors:
(1) whether the harm done was physical as opposed to
economic; (2) whether the conduct involved indifference to the
health or safety of others; (3) whether the victim was financially
vulnerable; (4) whether the conduct involved repeated actions or was
isolated; and (5) whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff
resulted from conduct that was known or suspected to be unlawful.
BMW, 517 U.S. at 576-77.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the EEOC, there
was evidence of at least three of these factors (the second, fourth, and
fifth). Therefore, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could find that FedEx higher management officials had acted
reprehensibly with respect to Lockhart's need for accommodations.
Next, FedEx argues that it is entitled to a remittitur
based on the 12.5 to 1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages
awards. The Court disagrees that a 12.5 to 1 ratio is constitutionally
unacceptable.
Finally, the Court holds that the fact that the punitive
damages award, when aggregated with the compensatory damages award, was
substantially below the $300,000 statutory cap on damages provides
additional support for the reasonableness and constitutionality of the
punitive damages award. Even if the district court had based its refusal
to reduce the punitive damages award solely on the fact that the award
was below the statutory cap, this Court would have affirmed in light of
at least three relevant factors: reprehensibility, proportionality, and
the statutory cap.