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Garland's Digest
on employment discrimination law
online since 1997
 

 

Disclaimer: The case on which this summary is based may no longer be current law. Also, if the case was decided on summary judgment, the court recited the "facts" in the light most favorable to the non-movant, which may not be the true facts.

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Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. November 8, 2001) (en banc)

Keywords: 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 (individual capacity)

Introduction/Facts: This 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action is not an employment discrimination action. It is an excessive force case. However, this case does set forth when a plaintiff has sued a state actor in his or her individual capacity.

Law:

1. In Wells v. Brown, 981 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1989), the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs seeking damages under Section 1983 must clearly set forth in their pleading that they were suing state officials as individuals, rather than officials.
2. The Court in Wells set forth two rationales for this rule: (1) the Court was concerned that defendants receive notice of the possibility of individual liability; and (2) Section 1983 plaintiffs must plead capacity for jurisdictional reasons because the Eleventh Amendment creates a jurisdictional bar to suits against states and state employees sued in their official capacities.
3. As a point of clarification, some "state actors" are state employees and some are local government employees. The Eleventh Amendment only bars suits for money damages against States and state employees in their official capacity. Since the employees in the case at bar are municipal employees, the "Eleventh Amendment" rationale of Wells is not involved. The only rationale involved is giving notice to the individual defendants of potential monetary exposure.
4. The majority (the vote was 7-6) holds that the post-Wells jurisprudence shows that the Sixth Circuit has applied a "course of proceedings" test to determine whether Section 1983 defendants have received notice of the plaintiff's intent to hold them personally liable.
5. The "course of proceedings" test considers such factors as the nature of the plaintiff's claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, particularly claims of qualified immunity to determine whether the defendant had actual knowledge of the potential for individual liability. The test also considers whether subsequent pleadings put the defendant on notice of the capacity in which he or she is sued. The Court notes that it is mindful of the timing of subsequent filings in order to determine whether the parties are still in the early stages of litigation. This ensures both fairness to the defendants, Wells's first concern, and the resolution of any jurisdictional problems at an early stage, Wells's second concern.
6. In this case, the Court finds that the complaint refers to the officers throughout as the "individual defendants". It also seeks compensatory and punitive damages against "each of the defendants." Taken as a whole, the complaint provides sufficient notice that the officers are being sued as individuals.
7. Even if the complaint failed to provide sufficient notice, the plaintiff's response to the officers' motion to dismiss made it clear that they were being sued individually. Under the course of proceedings test, subsequent filings may rectify deficiencies in the initial pleadings.
8. The majority notes that the vast majority of circuits follow the course of proceedings test.
9. Additionally, the Court holds that the district court erred in refusing to allow Moore to amend his complaint because any amendment would have been futile based on the one year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit believes that Moore can satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3). This Rule allows an amendment to relate back to the date of the original filing if: (1) the requirements of Rule 15(c)(2) are met ("the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading)"; and (2) the defendant received notice of the suit within 120 days following the filing of the original complaint, and the defendant knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
10. Circuit Judge Gilman concurs in the results of the majority. However, he believes that the majority is changing Sixth Circuit law by adopting a course of proceedings test, and the majority should be forthright in stating that it is doing so.
11. Circuit Judge Suhrheinrich, joined by five others, dissents. He believes the Sixth Circuit has not previously followed a course of proceedings test. Moreover, even if the majority wished to change Sixth Circuit law and adopt a course of proceedings test, the dissent believes that the plaintiff would still not be able to proceed against the individual officers based upon the facts of this case.
12. Click here to see actual case.