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Disclaimer: The case on which this summary is based may no longer be current law. Also, if the case was decided on summary judgment, the court recited the "facts" in the light most favorable to the non-movant, which may not be the true facts.

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Coward v. ADT Sec. Systems, Inc., 194 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. November 12, 1999)

Keywords: 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (race discrimination, unequal pay)

Introduction: Edward Coward sued ADT under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 alleging unequal pay because of race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment on behalf of ADT. The D.C. Circuit reversed in Coward v. ADT Sec. Systems, Inc., 140 F.3d 271 (D.C. Cir. April 10, 1998). The district court granted summary judgment again, and the D.C. Circuit reverses again.

Facts: ADT maintains a salary grade structure consisting of grades E-3 through E.20.  Each grade has five salary steps.  As a result, salary ranges between grades overlap.

Coward, who is African-American, was an E-8.  He was briefly promoted in March of 1994 to the position of Telecommunications Network and Facilities Manager (TNFM), a position purportedly carrying a grade of E-9. Approximately one year later, on April 19, 1995, ADT reclassified him from E-9 back to E-8, later changing his title to "Technical Support." In his reclassified grade and position, Coward earned more than most Technical Support staff; but less than most TNFMs, all of whom are white. 

Law:

  1. In granting summary judgment on behalf of ADT, the district court relied on ADT's proffered nondiscriminatory reason: after Coward's grade and position were reclassified, he earned less than the cited white employees because he had fewer job responsibilities.
  2. Because Coward offered no evidence to rebut this proffered reason, ADT is entitled to summary judgment.  The only problem is that this proffered reason only covers the time period after reclassification.  ADT failed to offer any nondiscriminatory reason for lower pay for the time period of March 1994 to April 1995.   Even though the district court "inferred" a nondiscriminatory reason, the employer must offer a nondiscriminatory reason.  Therefore, the grant of summary judgment is revered in part to allow ADT an opportunity to offer a nondiscriminatory reason (and to offer Coward a chance to rebut it).
  3. Circuit Judge Williams concurs in part and dissents in part.

 



 

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